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RECENT CASES.
AGENcY-AUTHORITY oF TRAVELING SALESMAN TO SELL His SAMPLEs-A
traveling salesman was supplied by his employer, the plaintiff, with samples
and instructions that they were to be returned intact and that "if a number
were missing, he was to pay for it." The salesman pledged a trunk contain-
ing samples with the defendant, who relied in good faith on his representa-
tions that he was authorized to sell them. Held: An agent selling by sample
needs them in order to accomplish the purpose of his agency; therefore, the
natural inference is that the samples themselves were not for sale. And in
this case, since the instructions did not amount to express authority to the
agent to sell any part of the samples, the pledgee is liable to the principal
in action to recover them. Cleveland Knitting Mills v. Shaff, i45 N. Y. S.
1o9 (1914).
In the few jurisdictions in which the question has arisen, it has been
decided as in the principal case, that a traveling salesman has no implied
authority from the nature of his employment to sell his samples. Savage v.
Felton, i Colo. App. 148 (i8gi) ; Hibbard v. Stein, 45 Ore. 5o7 (i904) ; Kohn
v. Washer, 64 Tex. 131 (1885). No authority to sell is to be inferred from
the mere possession of goods. Cole v. Northwestern Bank, L. R. io C. P.
354 (Eng. i875). The agent must have at least the apparent right of dis-
posal, in order to bind his principal by a sale. Saltus v. Everett, 2o Wend.
267 (N. Y. 1838). Where the principal sues his agent's vendee for the pur-
chase price, a previous invalid sale of samples will of course be ratified.
Bailey v. Pardridge, i34 Ill. 188 (i8go).
ASSAULT AND BATTERY-SELF-DEFENSE-INJURY TO BYSTANDER-A
sheriff; in making the arrest of an escaping felon, was compelled to shoot in
self-defense. His shot missed his assailant, and 9truck a bystander. Held:
The sheriff is not liable to the bystander for his injuries unless he was
guilty of negligence. Shaw v. Lord, 137 Pac. Rep. 885 (Okla. 1914).
The decision in the principal case shows clearly the basis of the rule of
self-defense, that a man when attacked may use reasonable force to repel
that attack and is not himself guilty of an assault until he exceeds this
amount. The rule might be thought to be based on the theory that the man
who first commenced the attack should not object if the force offered by
him was in turn repelled by force. But, as appears from the decision in the
principal case, the theory at the foundation of the self-defense rule is that
the law so recognizes the necessity for allowing a man who is attacked to
use the primitive methods of self-help that it considers an act which would
otherwise be unlawful, to be lawful if done in self-defense. Thus the rule
of self-defense is, not that the aggressor because he wrongfylly commenced
the fight is precluded from recovery for a wrongful assault, but that an
assault committed in self-defense is a lawful act, upon which no recovery by
the aggressor or any one else can be predicated, unless negligence is shown.
The fiew decisions on this question are in accord with the principal case.
Morris v. Platt, 32 Com. 75 (1864) ; Paxton v. Boyer, 67 Ill. 132 (1873).
Contra, Bessey v. Oliot, L. Raym. 468 (Eng. 1682).
BANKRUPTcY-LIQuoR LICENSE AS AN AssET-A license to sell liquor
issued to the bankrupts was unexpired at the time of their adjudication. A
rule of court provided that all licensees against whom no remonstrance was
filed would be presumed to be entitled to a renewal of their licenses. Held:
The right to the unexpired term, with its contingent right of a renewal,
ceased to belong to the bankrupts and both passed to a purchaser under a
sale by the brankrupts' receiver, so that the bankrupts could properly be
compelled to join in such proceedings as were necessary to make the sale
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effective for the benefit of creditors. In re Doyle and Son, 209 Fed. Rep. I
(1913).
In practically all jurisdictions there are statutes providing for the trans-
fer of liquor licenses under certain prescribed conditions. Universally in
bankruptcy cases the courts have held that the unexpired term, altho a mere
contingency, has a market value, and so is an asset of the bankrupt. In re
Becker, 98 Fed. Rep. 4o7, 2 N. B. N. Rep. 245 (1899); Fisher v. Cushman,
103 Fed. Rep. 860, 43 C. C. A. 381, 51 L. R. A. 292 (1goo); Deggender v.
B. & M. Co., 83 Pac. Rep. 898, 4 L- R. A. (N. S.) 626 (Wash. i9o6). It is
clear that the market value and corresponding worth of the unexpired term
is increased by a rule of court such as we have in the principal case, and it
will be held an asset in the hands of the trustee in bankruptcy. In re
Weesel, 173 Fed. Rep. 718 (io9). So also where a rule of the licensing
power practically assures a transfer to the purchaser from the trustee. In
re Fisher, 98 Fed. Rep. 89 (i8g9). In New York the Liquor Tax Law of 1896
gives a license the characteristics and some of the essential elements of prop-
erty. People v. Durante, 19 App. Div. 292, 54 N. Y. Supp. io73 (1897).
In some jurisdictions, although there are statutes authorizing or per-
mitting transfers, a license is considered a mere personal privilege, intangible,
and not a property right. Voight v. Board of Excise, 59 N. J. L. 358, 36 Atl.
Rep. 686, 37 L. R. A. 292 (1896) ; Bonnie & Co. v. Perry, 117 Ky. 459, 78 S.
W. Rep. 2o8 (1904). So it is not subject to a chattel mortgage. Feigen-
span v. Mulligan, 51 At. Rep. 191 (N. J. Eq. 19o2). A license cannot be
assigned. State v. Lydick, ii Neb. 366, 9 N. W. Rep. 56o (i88i). Nor
- does it pass to the personal representatives of a decedent. In re Grimm, I8l
Pa. 223, 37 Atl. Rep. 403 (1897). On the other hand, it seems that if the
personal representative of the deceased licensee secures a renewal or trans-
fer of the license to himself, and conduct the business as part of the business
of the estate of his testator, it will not become an asset of the representative
individually. Graeser's Estate, 23o Pa. 145, 79 Atl. Rep. 242 (1911).
CoNTRAcs-LFGALITy-CusTODY OF CHI.EnN-The plaintiff who had
been separated from her husband contracted with her father-in-law in con-
sideration of the latter's agreement to provide for her during her lifetime,
to transfer to him the custody and control of her child. Held: Since the
contract was clearly for the benefit of child, by reason of the father-in-law's
superior ability to support the child, it was not void as against public policy.
Upon performance by the plaintiff, she was entitled to specific performance.
Clark v. Clark, 89 Atl. Rep. 4o4 (Md. 1913).
As a general rule in England and in the majority of American jurisdic-
tions, a contract whereby a parent divest himself of his parental
duty and power by disposing of his right to the custody and control of his
child, is void as contrary to public policy. Hamilton v. Hector, L. R. 6 Ch.
App. 7oi (Eng. 1871) ; Kuhn v. Breen, 47 Ia. 435 (1877) ; Chopsky v. Wood,
26 Kan. 65o (1881); Grime v. Borden, 166 Mass. 198 (1896); Hibette v.
Baines, 78 Miss. 695 (19oo), unless made in accordance with the provisions
of a statute. Sargent v. Sargent, io6 Cal. 541 (1895); Miller v. Wallace, 76
Ga. 479 (1886). Accordingly, the parent may repudiate the contract and
regain possession of the child at any time, provided that he is a fit person
to have control. Sheers v. Stems, 75 Wis. 44 (1889). However, where the
custody of the child has been relinquished by the parent, and the former has
become bound by ties of affection to its custodian, it will not be restored to
the parent, if such restoration is not for the best interest of the child.
Hoxsie v. Potter, i6 R. L 374 (1888); Merritt v. Swimley, 82 Va. 433 (I886).
There are some jurisdictions which take the view of the principal case
that a contract leading to the separation of a child from its parent is not
void, provided that it is not to the detriment of the child. Enders v. Enders,
i64 Pa. 266 (x894) ; Van Dyne v. Vreeland, ii N. J. Eq. 370 (1857) ; Fletcher
v. Hickman, 50 W. Va. 244 (19Ol).
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A third person who abducts a child cannot attack the validity of 
the
contract under which the custody of such child has been transferred. 
Clark
v. Bayer, 32 Ohio, z 9 (1877). It has been held that .an agreement 
between
the father and mother whereby the former divests himself of the 
custody of
his children is invalid, unless made under a court's direction. 
Johnson v.
Terry, 34 Conn. 259 (1867). An antenuptial agreement providing 
for the
religious training of future offspring is invalid. In re Agar-Ellis, 
L. R. io
Ch. Div. 49 (Eng. 1878).
CRIMINAL PROCEDUE-IS THE ALLOCATUS NEcEssARY?-It 
is not reversible
error, even in capital cases, not to ask the prisoner if he 
has any reason to
give why sentence should not be passed. Dutton v. State, g9 Att. 
Rep. 417
(Md. 1914).
In this case the Court of Appeals of Maryland has joined 
the very small
minority of jurisdictions. The almost unanimous doctrine 
is that in capital
offenses the accused should be asked if he has anything 
to say why sen-
tence should not be pronounced. Rex v. Speke, 3 Salk. 
358 (Eng. 169i);
State v. Ikenor, 107 La. 48o (19o2); Jones v. State, 5i Miss. 718 (1875);
West v. State, 2 Zab. 212 (i849); State v. Johnson, 67 
N. C. 55 (1872);
Messner v. People, 45 N. Y. I (1872) ; Hamilton v. Comm., I6 Pa. x29 (i85I) 
;
Dougherty v. Comm., 69 Pa. 286 (87); Ball v. U. S., 140 U. S. I8 (I891);
Schwab v. Berggren, 143 U. S. 442 (1893). In felonies 
less than capital,
opinions are divided as to the necessity for the allocatus. 
Some of the cases
holding it-necessary are: Safford v. People, I Par. Cr. 
474 (N. Y. 1854);
Croker v. State, 47 Ala. 53 (872) ; People'v. Walker, i32 Cal. 237 
(I9O) ;
State v. Kile, 231 Mo. 59 (igio); McCormick v. State, 66 Neb. 337 
(I9O3);
Comm. v. Preston, x88 Pa. 429 (i898). Cases holding 
it unnecessary are:
Lamb v. People, 219 Ill. 399 (igo6); State v. Lund, 51 
Kan. I (x893) ; State
v. Sims, 117 La. 1036 (igo6) ; Jeffries v. Com., 
12 Allen, i45 (Mass. i866);
U. S. v. Sena, I5 N. M. 187 (igo); Jones v. State, 5, Miss. 718 
(1875);
State v. Nagel, 136 Mo. 45 (18g6); State v. Sally, 
41 Ore. 336 (i9o2);
Turner v. U. S., 66 Fed. Rep.- 287 (i895). In misdemeanors, 
the allocatus
has never been held necessary at the common law, 
State v. Bradley, 3o La.
Ann. 326 (1878), though a statute in Ohio has changed 
the common law in
this respect.
Upon being asked whether he has anything to say, 
the accused may
move in arrest of judgment if he has not done 
it before: Popish Lord's
Case, 7 How. St. Tr. 1217 (Eng. i68o); or he may 
plead a pardon should
he have one, Rex v. Garside, 2 A. & E. 266 
(Eng. 1834); or existing
insanity, State v. Bethrine, 88 S. C. 401 (Ig1).
In view of the fact that under our modern practice 
it is practically
impossible for the prisoner to suffer from the omission 
of the allocatus, and
also due to the fact that the various reasons originally 
given for this prac-
tice are not applicable at the present 
day, there seems to be a growing
tendency, even where capital punishment is inflicted, 
to dispense with this
ceremony, or at least to consider it not essential.
Furthermore, even where it is held to be a necessary 
formality, it is
the prevalent opinion that in case of an omission 
thereof, the entire record
need not therefore be reversed, but only this part, 
and a new sentence
under due steps may be given, in other words, 
the error only affects the
sentence, and not the verdict. Reynolds v. State, 
68 Ala. 502 (i88i); Reech
v. State, i5 Fla. 591 (876) ; State v. Jennings, 24 Kan. 
642 (i88i) Dodge
v. People, 4 Neb. 220 (1876); McCue v. Comm., 78 Pa. 185 
(1875); Comm.
v. Preston, i88 Pa. 429 ('898) ; State v. Trezevant, 
20 S. C. 363 (1883).
CRIMINALPROCEDUREr--MUST INDICTMENTNEGATIVE 
PROVISO IN STATUTE?-
The Connecticut Act of 19II, in section one, penalizes 
any person sell-
ing food in package form, unless the net quantity 
of the contents be
marked on the outside of the package. Section 
three, however, provides
that no penalty shall be enforcd for any violation 
arising from the sale of
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food prepared and inclosed in package form prior to eighteen months after
the passage of the act. Held: An indictment or information under this
statute is sufficient, though it does not negative the above mentioned pro-
viso; the fact that the sale is within the proviso is purely a matter of
defence. State v. McGee, 9z Alt. Rep. 270 (Conn. 1914).
There has been much doubt in the cases as to when it is necessary to
expressly negative the proviso in a statute. The authorities are not at all
consistent, and have reached conclusions dependent largely upon the posi-
tion of the proviso in the statute-whether in the enacting clause or in a
separate section, etc. The underlying principle is well settled, viz.: that the
indictment on a statute, like any other indictment, must show a prima
facie case, and it need not do more. Therefore, if the statute has excep-
tions, provisos, and the like, those which are affirmative elements in the
offense, must be negatived in averment, while those in the nature of
defense may be disregarded. In the application of this principle, the courts
have looked to the location of the several clauses or provisions in thestatute, and have laid down the broad general doctrine that where the
excusing matter stands in clauses, separate from the main provision, "it is
not necessary to state in the indictment that the defendant does not come
within the exceptions, or to negative the proviso it contains. Nor is it
even necessary to allege that he is not within the benefit of its proviso,
though the purview should expressly notice them, as by saying that none
shall do the act prohibited, except in the cases thereinafter excepted. For
all these are matters not anticipated, but which are more properly to come
from the prisoner." But if exceptions are "in the enacting clause, it will
be necessary to negative them, in order that the description of the crime
may in all respects correspond with the statute." i Chitty Cr. L. 283 b. 284,
and cases there cited; Ex parte Horne, r54 Cal. 355 (i9o8) ; Richardson v.
State, 77 Ark. 321 (i9o6) ; Ferrell v. State, 45 Fla. 26 (1903) ; Ritchens v.
State, 1i6 Ga. 847 (i92); Ferners v. State, 151 Ind. 247 (1898); State v.
Knowles, go Md. 646 (igoo) ; People v. Allen, 122 Mich. (1896) ; State v. Call,
121 N. C. 643 (1897) ; State v. Hutchinson, 55 Ohio St 573 (1897') ; State v.
Doering, 194 Mo. 398 (19o6); State v. Marks, 65 N. J. L. 84 (igoo).
The editor of the 1913 Edition of Bishop on Criminal Procedure, how-
ever, takes the position that this broad distinction disregards the nicer
shades discoverable in the later decisions, and from a more exact study of
the decisions lays down eight rules governing this subject, as follows:
(i) The negative of all exceptions in the enacting clause should be
averred, unless such in form and substance that an affirmative offense
will appear without. (2) A negative description of the offense must be
alleged. (3) However mutually located are the provisions of a statute,
an indictment thereon, as on the common law, must aver all negatives
necessary to show affirmatively an offense. (4) As on the common law,
so on a statute, the indictment need not negative matter of defence. (5)
In general, an exception or proviso which is not in the enacting clause,
whether in the same section with it or not, need not be negatived. (6)
Where there is in the enacting clause, a reference to an exception or pro-
viso more fully stated in a separate clause or statute, the indictment is
required to negative it or not, according as the form of the expression and
the nature of the matter render the latter an element in the prima faciA
offense or in the defence. (7) A negative not required by law may be
rejected as surplusage. (8) A negative averment need not be so minute,
or so nearly in the statutory words, as must an affirmative one; but any
negation in general terms, covering the entire substance of the matter, will
suffice. Bishop on Crim. Pro. (1913 Ed.), Vol. II, §§636-642.
INSURANCE-PROOF OF DEATH-PRESUMPTIONs-The assured, who had
been on good terms with his wife and steadily employed, left home on
November i5, I9o3, and was never seen or heard of again. His wife could
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not actually prove that he was dead, Held: The usual presumption that con-
tinued absence from one's last and usual residence raises a presumption of
death applies and the wife is not barred from recovery from the fact that
she cannot bring actual proof of death. Mannheimer v. Independent Order
of Ahawas Israel, 145 N. Y. S. 74 (i914).
This decision represents the weight of modern authority where there is
no provision in the insurance policy barring any claim based upon disappear-
ance or that actual proof of death shall be a condition precedent to recovery
on the policy. Kelly v. Supreme Council, 46 App. Div. 79 (N. Y. 1899).
The presumption of death after absence for seven years is an adminis-
trative presumption of law. It was found necessary in order that estates
should be distributed, that persons should be able to re-marry without crim-
inal consequences if the absent husband of wife were not dead, etc. There
is no presumption as to the time at which death takes place. Davie v.
Briggs, 97 U. S. 628 (878); Lynan v. Doe, 7 L. J. Exch. 335 (1837);
McCarter v. Camel, x Barb. Ch. 455 (1846), although the logical inference
from facts introduced in evidence may warrant the jury in finding that the
death occurred well within the statutory period. Whiting v. Nicoll, 46 Ill.
230 (i867); Chapman v. Kullman, 191 Mo. 237 (9o5). On the other hand,
the presumption of death may be rebutted by proof that the absentee is a
fugitive from justice, Mutual Ben. L Ins. Co. v. Martin, io8 Ky. zi (igoo);
Wolff's Estate, 12 W. N. C. 535 (Pa. 1883), or has some other reason for
concealing his identity. Donovan v. Twist, 93 N. Y. S. 99o (i9o5). In the
latter case the burden of producing rebutting inferences is on the party
against whom the presumption operates. Magness v. Modem Woodmen of
America, 123 N. W. Rep. 169 (Iowa, igog); Hoyt v. Newbold, 45 N. J. L.
219 (1883), and until such rebutting evidence is produced the presumption
establishes a prima facie case. Willcox v. Trenton Potteries Co., 64 N. J.
Eq. 173 (i9o2); Magness v. Modem Woodmen-of America, supra.
For a thorough discussion of presumption, see 62 UNIv. or P. L. R. 585.
.zBa--PRivnraGE COmmUNIcATioN-MAicE-The defendant, the father
of a pupil in a district school, wrote a letter to the county superintendent
of schools, which contained charges of impropriety by another pupil upon
the school grounds during school and recess hours. Held: The communica-
tion was qualifiedly privileged. Hausen v. Hausen, I48 N. W. Rep. 457
(Minn. i914).
A communication made by one on a subject in relation to which he has
an interest or a moral duty, to another having a correspoding interest or
duty, is conditionally privileged. Kluick v. Colby, 46 N. Y. 427 (871);
Caldwell v. Story, 107 Ky. 70 (I889). A qualified privilege attaches to a
communication addressed by a member of the public to a public officer.
Tyree v. Harrison, ioo Va. 54o (1902) ; Bingham v. Gaynor, 125 N. Y. Supp.
216 (igIo). The communication being privileged, the burden is cast upon
the plaintiff to show malice in fact. Coloney v. Farrow, 5 App. Div. 6o7
(N. Y. 1896); Denver P. W. Co. v. Hallaway, 34 Colo. 432 (igio). The law
does not imply malice from the communication itself, nor from its falsity,
as in the ordinary case of libel. Hebner v. Great Nt. Ry. Co., 78 Minn. 289
(igoo). Malice may be established by the unnecessary publicity of the com-
munication. Fresh v. Cutter, 73 Md. 87 (i89o). And the privilege may be
lost if the publication is made maliciously or contains matter unnecessaryr
for the protection of the defendant's interest. Wilson v. Barnett, 45 Ind.
163 (1873). Where the communication is absolutely privileged, the question
of malice is immaterial. Lauder v. Jones, 13 N. D. 525 (1904). But a
qualifiedly privileged communication requires both an occasion of privilege
and the use of that occasion in good faith. Wright v. Lothrop, 149 Mass.
385 (1889); Conroy v. Pittsburgh "Times," 139 Pa. 334 (1891); Hollen-
beck v. Ristine, 105 Ia. 488 (i898).
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It is held that this principle does not apply where the communication
is irrelevant to the occasion, even though the occasion is privileged. Blakes-.
lee v. Carroll, 64 Conn. 223 (1894); Hines v. Shumaker, 97 Miss. 669
(1911). In the course of judicial proceedings, however, even irrelevant
statements are at least conditionally privileged. Lauson v. Hicks, 38 Ala.
229 (1862); Myers v. Hodges, 53 Fla. 197 (9o7).
LiBFL-PRmLvGE-PLEAINGs-The defendant, in an affidavit in support
of its motion for new trial, knowingly made the false and malicious state-
ment that illicit relations existed between the plaintiff and her principal wit-
ness. Held: Since the statement was relevant, for the reason that at the
trial the witness had appeared disinterested, it was absolutely privileged and
could not be the subject of an action for libel. Keeley v. Great Northern
Rwy., I45 N. W. Rep. 664 (Wis. 1914).
This decision is in accord with the great weight of authority in the
United States. Buschbaum v. Herriot, 63 S. E. Rep. 645 (Ga. i9o9);
McLaughlin v. Cowley, 127 Mass. 316 (1879); Jones v. Brownlee, 161 Mo.
258 (i9ol); Kemper v. Fort, 219 Pa. 85 (19o7); Link v. Moore, 84 Hun
118 (N. Y. 1895) ; King v. McKissick, 126 Fed. Rep. 215 (1903). In England,
absolute privilege is extended to statements in pleadings, although they are
false, malicious and irrelevant. Hudson v. Pare (i89g), I Q. B. 455. In
Canada, such statements are privileged only when relevant and made in
good faith. Charlebois v. Bourassa, Mont. L. Rep. 5 Super. Ct. 423 (1889).
Allegations in pleadings are only conditionally privileged in Louisiana. Dunn
w. Southern Ins. Co., i6 La. 431 (19o6).
The doctrine of absolute immunity, intended to protect the interest of
the public and to foster unrestricted administration of justice, obviously
leaves the party defamed without an adequate remedy. An indictment for
perjury may of course be brought. Doyle v. O'Doherty, Car. & M. 418
(Eng. x842). The court will sometimes order scandalous matter to be
expunged from the pleadings. Christie v. Christie, L. R. 8 Ch. App. 499
(1872). But, even for matter so expunged, an action for damages will not
lie. Kennedy v. Hilliard, io Ir. C. L. R. 195 (1859). It has been inti-
mated that where a complaint has been filed as a cloak to libellous state-
ments, the privilege will be lost, notwithstanding that the allegations were
relevant. Dada v. Piper, 41 Hun 254 (N. Y. 1886). However, such a
qualification to the general rule has been declared unsound. Runge v.
Franklin, 72 Tex. 585 (I889).
Where libellous statements are published before a court having no juris-
diction over the subject matter, they are only conditionally privileged. John-
son v. Brown, 13 W. Va. 71 (1878). But if the court has such jurisdiction,
absolute immunity will not be lost for the sole reason that the declaration
fails to state a cause of action. Wilson v. Sullivan, 81 Ga. 238 (1888).
NEGLIGENE-LIABILITY OF CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS FOR TORTS OF
SERVANTS-A patient, while unconscious from the influence of anesthetics,
was placed in a bed in which a hot water bottle had been negligently left
by an employee of the hospital, and was severely burned. .Held: The hos-
pital is liable, not having used ordinary care in the selection and retention
of its servant. St. Paul's Sanitarium v. Williamson, 164 S. W. Rep. 36
(Tex. 1914).
There is a considerable difference in judicial opinion as to when, if at
all, a charitable institution should be liable for the negligence of its servants.
Some jurisdictions, notably Pennsylvania, hold that as a matter of public
policy, charitable institutions are exempt from all liability. The basis of
this view is that otherwise the trust fund, given for the purposes of charity,
might be entirely destroyed and diverted from the purposes for which the
donor intended it. Boyd v. Fire Ins. Patrol, 120 Pa. 624 (i888); Gable v.
St. Francis, 227 Pa. 254 (igio); Jenson v. Maine Ear and Eye Infirmary,
1O7 Me. 408 (i91o); Perry v. House of Refuge, 63 Md. 20 (1884). In New
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York it is held that the exemption from liability applies only to those who
are the recipients of the favor of charitable institutions, not to the rights
of others. Hordern v. Salvation Army, i99 N. Y. 233 (910). Other juris-
dictions, in accord with the principal case, hold that a hospital is only
liable if it has not used due care in the selection and retention of its servants.
Powers v. Massachusetts Homeopathic Hospital, ioi Fed. Rep. 896 (igoo);
MacDonald v. Mass. General Hospital, 120 Mass. 432 (1876) ; Texas Central
R. R. Co. v. Zumwalt, io3 Tex. 6o3 (igio).
In any event the fact that the institution receives pay from those who
receive the benefit of its charity is immaterial; the theory being that such
amounts are not for private gain, but to enable the institution to more
effectually carry out the purpose for which it was formed. Powers v. Mass.
Homeopathic Hospital, supra; Gable v. Sisters of St. Francis, supra.
PROPERTY-LATERAL SUPPORT-WiTHDRAWAL OF SUPPORT-A lot owner
erected a building on his property within three inches of his neighbor's
line. Subsequently the neighbor, in preparing for the erection of a build-
ing on his lot, excavated to a point below the wall of the building men-
tioned and because of the withdrawal of the lateral support it was injured.
Held: There is no liability to the part injured for more than nominal dam-
ages. McKeand v. Skirboll, 55 Pa. Sup. Ct. 28 (913).
It is well settled that the owner of land is entitled to lateral support
for his.ground in its natural state. Farrand v. Marshall, Ig Barb. 38o
(N. Y. 1853); Urer's Appeal, 81'A Pa.-203 (1874); Gilmore v. Driscoll,
x22 Mass. 199, 23 Am. St. Rep. 312 (1877). Nor will the right be lost by
the mere placing of structures upon the land, where the structures are of
such character as not to materially increase the weight or pressure. Oneil
v. Harkins, 8 Bush, 65o (Ky. 1871); White v. Tebo, 43 N. Y. App. Div.
418, 6o N. Y. Supp. 231 (1899). But the right does not include the support
for substantial superstructures placed upon the land which materially increase
the weight and pressure. Thurston v. Hancock, 12 Mass. 220, 7 Am. Dec.
57 (1815) ; Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U. S. 635, 25 L. Ed. 336 (1878) ;
McGettigan v. Potts, 149 Pa. 155, 30 W. N. C. 137 (1892). It seems clear,
however, that the excavations causing the removal of the lateral support
and resultant damage to the superstructure must be carried on with due care.
Negligence will create liability for all damages resulting. Gildersleeve v.
Hammond, io9 Mich. 431, 33 L. R. A. 46, 67 N. W. Rep. 519 (i896) ; Bona-
parte v. Wiseman, 89 Md. 12, 44 L. R. A. 482 (i899) ; Hammicker v. Lepper,
2o S. D. 371, lO7 N. W. Rep. 202, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 243 (i9o6). Even the
fact that there is an intervening lot will not prevent the jury from find-
ing that, under the circumstances, there was negligence. Witherow v. Tanne-
hill, i94 Pa. 21, 44 Atl. Rep. io88 (i899). While there is no imperative
obligation or duty to notify the adjoining owner of one's intention to exca-
vate, the modern tendency is to hold failure to give notice sufficient to
justify the jury in finding that there is negligence. Bonaparte v. Wiseman,
s-upra; Schultz v. Byers, 53 N. J. L 442, 22 AtI. Rep. 514, 13 L. R. A. 569
(i89i); Spohn v. Dives, 174 Pa. 474, 34 Atl. Rep. 192 (1896). It has been
held that the employment of a skilled contractor to make the excavations
is a good defense to an imputation of negligence. Myers v. Hobbs, 57 Ala.
175, 29 Am. Rep. 719 (1876) ; but see contra, Bonaparte v. Wiseman, supra.
SALES-STATUTE oF FRAuDs-DELIVERY AND RECEnT OF SAMPLE-The
defendant agreed orally to sell cloth to the plaintiff to comply with certain
samples. The latter contends that acceptance and receipt of the samples takes
the agreement out of the statute. Held: Delivery of a sample forming no
part of the bulk to be bought and paid for is not such a delivery as will
satisfy the statute. Gold v. Gross, 164 N. Y. S. 164 (1914).
This decision is in accord with the prevailing rule that acceptance and
receipt of samples which are not part of the goods sold is not sufficient to
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satisfy the statute. Moore v. Love, 57 Miss. 765 (i88o); Carver v. Lane,
4 E. D. Smith, 168 (N. Y. 1855); Durson v. Petersmeyer, iog Iowa, 233
(1899). Otherwise if the samples are a part of the property sold, i. e., the
contract of sale is an entire one. Hinde v. Whitehouse and Galan, 7 East,
558 (Eng. i8o6); Brock v. Wiener, 37 Hun, 6o9 (N. Y. 1885).
There is a conflict of opinion as to what acceptance is necessary to
satisfy the statute. In some jurisdictions the acceptance must be made by
some act or conduct by the buyer manifesting an intention to accept the
goods as satisfying the contract. This is the same acceptance as is necessary
to the passage of title. Shindler v. Houston, I N. Y. 261 (1848); Rodgers
v. Jones, 129 Mass. 42o (1878); Mechanical Boiler Cleaner Co. v. Kellner,
62 N. J. L. 54 (1898). In other jurisdictions an absolute acceptance of the
goods as meeting the contract is unnecessary, but an acceptance which could
not have been made without admitting the contract and that the goods were
sent under it is sufficient. Page v. Morgan, 15 Q. B. D. 228 (Eng. 1885);
Smith v. Stoller, 26 Wis. 671 (I87O). But even in these jurisdictions mere
inspection of the goods does not amount to an acceptance. Taylor v. Smith,
2 Q. B. 65 (Eng. 1893).
The receipt required is a taking by the buyer of actual control of the
goods after they have been delivered by the seller. Hinchman v. Lincoln,
124 U. S. 38 (1888); Knight v. Mann, i2O Mass. 219 (1876); Michael v.
Curtis, 6o Comm. 363 (i89i). If the property remains in the seller's posses-
sion he must have lost his lien and agreed to hold as bailee of the buyer.
Devine v. Warner, 76 Conn. 229 (19o3); Safford v. McDonough, 120 Mass.
'qo (1876). If the property is in the possession of a third person as bailee
of the vendor, such third person must agree to hold as bailee for the vendee.
Gooch v. Holmes, 41 Me. 523 (1856); Marsh v. Rouse, 44 N. Y. 643 (1871).
SPE cC PERFORMANcE-PARoL ANTE-NuPTIAL. AGREEMENT IN CONSIDERA-
TION or MARRIAGE-An oral ante-nuptial agreement by a prospective husband
in consideration of marriage, to leave his entire estate to his wife at his
death, is within the Statute of Frauds. Consummation of the anticipated
marriage is not alone such part performance as to avoid the operation of the
statute and to render the contract specifically enforceable in equity. Watkins
v. Watkins, 89 At. Rev. 253 (N. J. 1913). Even though a fraud be com-
mitted, a court of equity is powerless to give relief, by specific performance.
Day v. Roby, 89 At. Rep. 305 (N. H. I913).
The rule followed in these two recent cases has been steadfastly adhered
to by the courts in England and the United States, where the fourth section
of the English Statute of Frauds, or a similar enactment, is in force. Caton
v. Caton, L R. 2 H. L. 127 (Eng. 1867); Bradley v. Sadler, 54 Ga. 681
(1875); Austin v. Kuehn, III Ill. App. 5o6 (i94); Deshon v. Wood, 148
Mass. r32 (1888); Hunt v. Hunt, 171 N. Y. 396 (19o2); Henry v. Henry,
27 Ohio, 121 (1875). A deed of conveyance, executed but not delivered
before marriage, is sufficient writing to take a verbal agreement out of the
operation of the statute. Wood v. Reed, 131 Mo. 553 (895). A settlement
after marriage in pursuance of a parol ante-nuptial promise is valid; Sat-
terthwaite v. Emley, 41 N. J. Eq. 489 (1845); except as against creditors.
Winn v. Albert, 5 Md. 66 (1851); contra, Hussey v. Castle, 4r Cal. 239
(1871).
Where there are .independent acts of part performance in connection
with a marriage, specific performance of a parol agreement, made in con-
sideration of the marriage, will be decreed. Thus, if a father, in con-
templation of the marriage of his daughter orally promises to give her
a certain house as a present, and shortly after the ceremony puts her and
her husband in possession, such possession constitutes sufficient part per-
formance. Ungley v. Ungley, L. R. 4 Ch. Div. 73 (Eng. 18'5); Duval v.
Getting, 3 Gill, 138 (Md. 1845). A fortiori, where improvements are made
following such a placing in possession, the verbal agreement will be speci-
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fically enforiced. Neale v. Neale, 76 U. S. 1 (I869). When through the
fraud of the promisor, an irretrievable change of situation occurs, equity will
grant relief. Peek v. Peek, 77 Cal. io6 (i888).
SPECIFIC PmFORMiANCE-PAROL CONTRACT OF SALE OF LAND.-The plaintiff,
by parol, agreed to convey a good title to certain land to the defendant,
free from incumbrance, except a ground rent. There was a mortgage on
the property, but it was agreed that the defendant should have the posses-
sion and the use of the property until the plaintiff secured a release of the
mortgage. The defendant entered and remained in possession, and also paid
a part of the purchase price. Held: The contract was enforceable at the
suit of the vendor. Caplan v. Buckner, 9i Atl. Rep. 481 (Md. 1914).
The authorities are ample to establish the doctrine that the mere fact
that the vendor's property is incumbered, or his title is defective, at the
time the contract of sale is made will not prevent his enforcing the contract
in equity. Dresel v. Jordan, 1o4 Mass. 407 (x87o) ; Miller v. Cameron, 45
N. J. Eq. 95 (1889). If he has removed the incumbrance and perfected the
title by the time he is required by his contract to convey it. Luckett v.
Wiliamson, 37 Mo. 397 (1866); Maryland Construction Co. v. Kuper, go Md.
529 (IgOO). And, generally, when he has acted in good faith relief will
be granted him, if he is ready to furnish a clear title at the time of the
decree, provided the delay has not prejudiced the purchaser and time is
not the essence of the contract. Gibson v. Brown, 214 Ill. 330 (9o5);
Van Riper v. Wickersham, 76 Atl. Rep. o2o (N. J. igio). But, in a few
States, it is held that the vendor must have title at the time of the contract.
Luse v. Deitz, 46 Ia. 205 (1877).
The decisions are in conflict as to whether possession alone is sufficient
to take the place of the writing required by the Statute of Frauds. In
England, possession is held to be a sufficient act of part performance to
satisfy the statute. Ungley v. Ungley, L. R. 5 Ch. Div. 887 (Eng. 1877).
And the following American authorities favor the rule that an oral contract
relating to real estate is taken out of the statute by delivery of possession.
Wharton v. Stoutenburgh, 35 N. J. Eq. 266 (1882); Robinson v. Thrail-
kill, iIO Ind. 117 (1886) ; Calanchini v. Bransteller, 84 Cal. 249 (i8go). Yet,
in a respectable number of States, the English rule of part performance has
been distinctly repudiated. Usher v. Flood, 83 Ky. 552 (1886); Fisher v.
Kuhn, 54 Miss. 48o (1893) ; North v. Bunn, 122 N. C. 766 (i898). However,
taking possession in pursuance of the contract together with payment in
full or in part, of the purchase price is recognized, in nearly all the jurisdic-
tions, as a sufficient part performance. Rovelsky v. Schener, 114 Ala. 419
(1896) ; Wilkins v. Miller, 17i Ill. 556 (1898).
ToRTs-MALiCiOUs PROSECUTION-PRoBABLE CAUsE-ADvIcE OF CouNsEL-
A sewing machine agent, acting upon the advice of the county attorney and
two other attorneys whom he put in possession of the facts, instituted an
action of embezzlement. The prosecution being dismissed, suit for malicious
prosecution was commenced against the agent. Held: The court should have
instructed the jury that the fact that the agent acted on the advice of
counsel was a good defence. Sewing Machine Co. v. Dyer, i6o S. W. Rep.
917 (Ky. 1913).
It is well settled that advice of counsel will serve as a defence in a suit
for malicious prosecution. Staunton v. Goshorn, 94 Fed. 52, 36 C. C. A. 75
(1899); Magowan v. Rickey, 64 N. J. L. 402, 45 Atl. Rep. 8o4 (Igoo). So a
defendant in such action will not be liable if he has laid all the facts before
an attorney and acted in good faith upon the opinion given by that attorney,
even though such opinion was erroneous. Hall v. Suydam, 6 Barb. 83
(N. Y. 1849); Waiter v. Sample, 25 Pa. 275 (1855); Wakely v. Johnson,
u5 Mich. 285 (1897). There must be a full and fair statement of all the
facts within the knowledge of the prosecuting witness. Leahey v. March,
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155 Pa. 458 (1893); Jones v. Morris, 97 Va. 43, 33 S. E. Rep. 377 (1899).
And if facts within the knowledge of the prosecuting witness are not fully
and fairly stated to the attorney, his advice will be no defence to the sub-
sequent action for malicious prosecution. Roy v. Goings, 112 Ill. 656 (i885) ;
Flora v. Russell, 138 Ind. 153, 37 N. E. Rep. 593 (I894) ; Webster v. Fowler,
89 Mich. 303, 5o N. W. Rep. io74 (i89i).
The counsel whose advice is sought and acted upon must be competent
and reputable in the community. It is not enough that the one consulted
has held himself out as an attorney at law and was believed to be such
by the party consulting him. Murphy v. Larsen, 77 Ill. 172 (1875); Davis
v. Baker, 88 Ill. App. 251 (1899). But he need not be described as "learned
in the law." Home v. Sullivan, 83 Ill. 3o (1876); O'Neal v. McKinna, i16
Ala. 6o6, 22 So. Rep. 905 (1897). Advice by a justice of the peace is not
a good defence. Brobst v. Ruff, ioo Pa. 91, 12 W. N. C. 494 (1882);
Beihoffer v. Loeffert, i59 Pa. 374 (1893).
TORTS-MINES AND MININa-PLuGGING ABANDONED WELL-The plaintiff,
owner of a small tract of land, executed an oil and gas lease thereon. Gas
was found in paying quantities. A lease on a large adjoining tract came
into the hands of the defendant company, which thereupon drilled a well
into the same strata of sand that supplied the plaintiff's well. Subsequently
the defendant, company abandoned their well without having plugged it or
taken any precaution against its causing damage. In consequence water
entered through the abandoned well into the gas-bearing strata of sand
and impeded the flow of gas into the plaintiff's well so that it became
worthless. Held: The defendant company is liable for the wanton and
negligent injury to the plaintiff's gas well, as well as for the statutory
penalty imposed for failure to plug an abandoned well. Atkinson v. Vir-
ginia Oil and Gas Co., 79 S. E. Rep. 647 (W. Va. 1913).
By statute in several States, as in West Virginia, a penalty is imposed
for failure to plug an abandoned oil or gas well. W. Va. Code of I9O6, chap.
62, sec. 2; Indiana Acts of i893, c. 36, §§2, 3, 4 and 5, amended by Acts of
1899, c. 61 (Burns' Ann. Stat. i9oi, §§75i, 7512, 7513, 7514) ; Kentucky Acts
i891-93, pp. 6o, 6i (Ky. St. 1899, §§3910-3914) ; Pennsylvania Act of June 1o,
1881, P. L. 11o. But none of these statutes give an adjacent owner redress
for damages arising out of a failure to comply with the statute. In the
lack of precedent and dearth of authority on the point involved, the court
in the principal case decided that the defendant company was liable for the
injury arising from its compliance with the statute, by analogy to the general
principle that an owner cannot rightfully pollute percolating -waters in his
premises so as to injure or destroy streams or wells supplied therefrom
on adjacent property. Gilmore v. Salt Co., 84 Kans. 729, 15 Pac. Rep. 541,
34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 48 (1911); Collins v. Gas Co., 139 Pa. I1, 21 Atl.
Rep. 147, affirming 131 Pa. 143, 18 Atl. Rep. io2, 6 L. R. A. 280 (189o).
ToRTs--RIGHT OF AcTioN FOR SEDucrio N OF FIANc E-The seduction and
debauching of a man's fiancee making proper the breach of the marriage
contract by him, gives the affianced husband no cause of action against the
seducer. Davis v. Condit, i44 N. W. Rep. io89 (Minn. 1914).
The right of a husband to recover for alienation of his wife's affections
is a right based upon the marital relation, and the loss of services suffered
by the husband. Matheis v. Mazet, 164 Pa. 58o (i894). So too the right of
action of a father to recover for the seduction of his daughter is based,
theoretically at least, on loss of services. Milligen v. Long, i88 Pa. 411
(i898). By analogy to these two cases it would seem that an affianced hus-
band could not recover for seduction of his fiancee because he could not
show any loss of services. Neither could he recover on the theory that
the seducer has wrongfully caused a breach of the marriage contract: the
breach of contract was by the man, not by his affianced wife, and though
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her conduct justified him in breaking it, yet that gives him no right of
action against the seducer. See in accord Case v. Smith, ioo Minn. 229
(89s).
TORTS-UFAIR ComruT TOxr-A furniture company had the agency for
the White Sewing Machine. The agency was taken away from it and given
to the plaintiff in the same city, whereupon the furniture company, for the
purpose of injuring the plaintiff in his business, wrongfully and maliciously
advertised to the public that it would sell the same machine handled by the
plaintiff at half the price at which he was offering them for sale. The jury
found that the sole purpose of the furniture company in advertising as
they did was to ruin the plaintiff in his business. Held: The competition
was mere simulation, and carried out with malice to injure the plaintiff
in his business and was therefore actionable. Boggs v. Duncan-Schell Fur-
niture Company, 143 N. W. Rep. 482 (Iowa, 1i94).
The rule of the common law has been that the existence of a malicious
motive in the case of an act which is not in itself illegal will not convert
the act into a civil wrong for which reparation can be recovered by the one
injured. Allen v. Flood (I898), App. Cas. z; Bohn Mfg. Co. v. Hollis, 54
Minn. 223, 21 L. R. A. 337, 55 N. W. Rep. ili9 (1893) ; 2 Cooley on Torts
(3rd Ed.), Chap. XXII, p. 830. But the tendency of the modern cases, with
which the principal case is in accord, is to hold that when an act, altho
otherwise lawful, is actuated by no legitimate trade purpose and solely with
the malicious intent to injure the business of another it becomes unlawful
and entitles the one injured thereby to recover. This rule has been applied
where there has been an interference with contractual relations between the
plaintiff and third persons. Van Horn v. Van Horn, 52 N. J. L. 484, io
L. R. A. 184, 2o Atl. Rep. 485 (i89o); Doremus v. Hennesey, 62 Ill. App.
391, 176 Ill. 6o8, 43 L R. A. 797 (1898). And where there has been a con-
spiracy to ruin the plaintiff by ceasing to deal with him and inducing others
to do the same. Delz v. Winfree, 8o Tex. 400, i6 S. W. Rep. rii (i8gi);
Ertz v. Produce Exchange, 79. Minn. 145, 42 L. R. A. go, 81 N. W. Rep. 737
(igoo). It has also been extended, as in the principal case, to cases of severe
competition maliciously started for the purpose of driving the plaintiff out
of business. Tuttle v. Buck, lO7 Minn. 145, 22 L. R A. (N. S.) 599, ug9
N. W. Rep. 946, 131 Am. St. Rep. 446 (iO9); Dunshee v. Standard Oil
Co., 132 N. W. Rep. 371, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 263 (Iowa, I912). Recovery
has been allowed where an employer has maliciously ordered its employees
to refrain from dealing with the plaintiff (an adjacent retailer) under
threat of expulsion. Wesley. v. Lumber Co., 97 Miss. 814, 53 So. Rep. 346
(igio). But see contra, Lewis v. Lumber CO., 121 La. 658, 46 So. Rep. 685
(98).
